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Chapter 1: Inroduction
Around the time of the campaign of Meiji 27-8 (1894-5), my school life had just ended –
1894 began and I had just stepped out into the world. But, to speak of how I felt at that
time about the Japan-Qing campaign, I was extremely worried about whether we would
win or lose. Would Japan succeed, I worried, or would we end up like the Taikō
Hideyoshi, a disaster? I think many people were probably thinking the same thing.
Ōmori Kingorō, 19151
Ōmori Kingorō’s (1867-1937) thoughts about the Japan-Qing campaign, or the SinoJapanese War (1894-5) as it is commonly known today, speak volumes about the zeitgeist of
Japan’s Meiji period (1868-1912). Although Meiji was a time of forward thinking as policy
makers, businessmen, social elites, and the average citizen alike thought deeply about the
country’s future, as Ōmori’s words indicate, it was also a time for retrospection. Indeed, although
in that time Japan experienced transformations that took the country in new directions – the
change of government, the integration of industrial technology, and the rapid influx of Western
culture – the projection of power onto the continent that was the hallmark of Meiji foreign policy
was in some respects a repetition of the past, calling to mind Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-98) and
the previous time a Japanese state had attempted to exert its might outside of its borders: the
Imjin War (1592-98).
That conflict, though a failure, was devastating for Joseon Korea (1392-1897). In April of
1592, Hideyoshi’s troops landed on the peninsula and quickly slashed their way from the
southern coast the northern border in a matter of months, leaving devastation in their wake, with
the largely unprepared and poorly equipped Korean military standing little chance against a
Japanese military armed with muskets and hardened by more than a century of warfare. However,
1
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due in large part to the intervention of the armies of Ming China (1369-1644) and the exploits of
the Joseon navy, Hideyoshi’s armies withdrew to the south in 1593. After a period of
negotiations from 1594-96 ended in failure, a punitive expedition was launched, laying waste to
the southern provinces for a second time. Upon Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, his troops were
withdrawn and until the Meiji era approximately 350 years later, the Japanese state made no
further attempts to exert political influence on the continent.
The Meiji period saw an end to this period of disinterest in continental affairs: not long
after the US navy forced Japan into the international world order, the new Meiji government
began initiating an active foreign policy characterized by increasingly overt attempts to achieve
political authority in Korea and China. As early as the 1870s, Japanese officials had already
debated invading Korea as a punitive response to a perceived slight to the nation’s honor.2 Later,
in 1894-5 and 1904-5 the Meiji government fought and won two wars with Qing China and
Czarist Russia respectively, in both cases regarding Japan’s authority over the Korean peninsula.
Furthermore in 1895, the Japanese military orchestrated an assassination of a pro-Russian
Korean queen and, in 1910, with the signing of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, the
peninsula fell under de-facto control of the Japanese government. As these incidents indicate, the
extension of political influence onto the continent was a major facet of Meiji-period foreign
policy.
Although Ōmori drew an association between Hideyoshi’s invasions and the SinoJapanese War, the foreign policy of both the Meiji government and Hideyoshi’s regime invite
comparison in their individual characteristics and in the broader context of Japanese history. In
the case of their characteristics, both featured a leadership that desired to exert authority on the
2
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continent, both involved military conflict with continental states, and both involved the fate of
Korea. In Japanese history as a whole, there are not many other examples of Japanese states
engaging in this kind of action on the continent. Aside from some mythologized invasions of
Korea from before written records appeared in Japan and some military assistance rendered to
the kingdom of Baekche (18 BCE – 660 CE) in the early centuries CE, the only two examples
available by the end of the Meiji period were the policies of the last few decades and the Imjin
War. Ōmori was probably right when he suggested that he was not the only one to make such an
association. What might such people have had to say about that earlier war, given the decades of
Meiji foreign policy that they had just experienced? The goal of the present essay is to
investigate this question. The following chapters present an examination of five books published
in the last years of the Meiji period, from 1905 to 1912, to determine what their authors had to
say about the Imjin War and to examine how their narratives reflect the context in which they
were written. In so doing, this essay reveals some ways in which recent events can shape
perceptions of the past.
The narratives considered here are all drawn from books published in the period from
1905 to 1912, or in other words from the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War to the end of the
Meiji era. The reasons for this choice are at once symbolic and also practical. Practically
speaking, this period takes place after decades of Meiji foreign policy, giving ample time for
writers to have developed new ideas about Hideyoshi and his invasions based on this new
context. Given that a major goal of this essay is to identify aspects of these narratives that can be
attributed to the circumstances of the Meiji period, books written at this time are an ideal place to
look. Symbolically, this period also straddles the annexation of Korea, which occurred in 1910.
The significance of this event is that, just over three hundred years after Hideyoshi failed to
3

conquer Korea, the Meiji government bloodlessly brought the peninsula under its control. Those
writing after the annexation would have particular cause to re-think the Imjin War.
In general, works examined here will be presented in chronological order, beginning with
the earliest works and progressing to the later. However, in the case of multiple works written by
the same author, they are considered together in the same chapter (see Table 1 on page 6 for a
complete list of works). Chapter 2 provides an overview of contemporary scholarship of the
period in question to provide a standard to which to compare the following works. Chapter 3
considers three books by Itō Gingetsu, a newspaper reporter, novelist, and commentator with a
nationalist bent who took a stance in praise of Hideyoshi and antagonistic to China. Chapter 4
considers Kemuyama Sentarō’s The True Affairs of the Invade Korea Debate, which traces the
origins of the issues associated with the 1870s debates within the Meiji government about
invading Korea and includes brief discussions of Hideyoshi and the Imjin war in this context.
Chapter 5 discusses the two chapters of Okuda Naoki’s Ancient Traces of Korea and Japan, a
collection of articles that the author wrote while living in Korea and that were originally
published serially in the Seoul Daily newspaper. Chapter 6 covers the works of Hayashi Taisuke,
a professionally trained historian and graduate of Waseda University, a writer who stands out for
his relative objectivity compared to the other authors examined here. Finally, the concluding
Chapter 7 contains an analysis of the overall features of Imjin War narratives in this time and
highlights important distinctions from work to work.
In analyzing the above works, this essay focuses predominantly on two factors: the way
that the author narrates the events and the author’s analysis of those events. In the first category,
the primary consideration is how the presentation of events might affect the reader’s attitudes
towards the various parties involved, China, Korea, Japan, or individual actors such as Hideyoshi
4

himself. To this end, this essay examines which facts are included and which are excluded, and
also whether or not the author makes dubious claims. In the second category, the essay
deconstructs the authors’ analyses to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, in the
process, the analysis also identifies the author’s own attitudes towards those involved in the
conflict and considers how the socio-political situation in the Meiji period may have influenced
them.
Given the broad scope of the Imjin War, however, this essay examines only the narratives
regarding the prelude to the war. Although this is an artificial constraint, the length of the
conflict and its related events necessitates this truncation: between the two separate invasions
1592-3 and 1597-8, the interim period of peace negotiations, and the eight or more years of
planning, preparation, and communication between Hideyoshi’s regime and other regional
powers, a complete analysis of every detail of the war could fill an entire volume. The choice of
the prelude over an even-by-event analysis of the entire war provides a distinct advantage: the
prelude offers the author a chance to lay blame for the conflict, which is a perfect chance for the
author to reveal his attitudes towards the involved parties.

5

Table 1 – Survey of Works, organized by topic
Category Distinctions
Category 1 Category 2
Histories of
the Imjin
War
Koreafocused
General
books
Histories of
Korea

Japanfocused
books

Topical
Histories
Biographies
of Hideyoshi

Title

Author

Year

Ancient Traces of Korea and Japan (日韓古
跡)

Okuda Naoki

1910

Hayashi Taisuke

1912

Hayashi Taisuke

1911

Kemuyama Sentarō

1907

Itō Gingetsu
Itō Gingetsu

1905
1906

Itō Gingetsu

1911

An Historical Overview of History of Korea
(朝鮮通史)
Early Modern Joseon History (朝鮮近世史).
The True Affairs of the Invade Korea Debate
(征韓論實相)
Japan, Country of the Sea (海国日本)
A History of Japanese Piracy (日本海賊史)
Hideyoshi in His Later Years (晩年の秀吉)
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Chapter 2: Overview of Contemporary
Narratives
The following is a summary of the events comprising the prelude to the war, from
Hideyoshi’s first recorded plans for the invasion in 1585 until troops landed at Busan in April,
1592. This, though heavily documented in Japanese, Korean, and Chinese sources alike,
nonetheless leaves some points unsettled due to conflicting sources and the fact that few scholars
have mastered the various languages in which these documents are recorded. As such, the
following summary should not be taken as a settled view. Any major discrepancies between the
sources considered here are indicated in the footnotes.
The first extant record of Hideyoshi’s desire to invade the continent appears in 1585 –
several years before he had even finished uniting Japan – in a letter to one of his vassals, in
which he mentions his eventual plan to attack the Ming. Over the course of the next seven years,
he would develop this idea, a process Samuel Hawley, Kitajima Manji, and Kenneth M. Swope
each summarize in their respective monographs about the war. 1 A 1586 letter first mentions
Joseon as a target of invasion as well, and a 1587 letter expresses his plan to order the King of
Joseon to submit to him and to only invade if he refuses. By 1588, the plan further expanded as
Hideyoshi expressed a desire to make Joseon, the “various southern barbarian countries” (南蛮

1

Hawley, 21.
Kitajima, 14-15.
Swope, 51-2.
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諸国),2 and Ryūkyū (modern day Okinawa) yield allegiance to him. By 1591, he was mobilizing
troops and gathering supplies, and building a castle in Nagoya as his headquarters.
The narrative of the prelude centers around Hideyoshi’s negotiations with the various
regional powers, including the kingdom of Ryūkyū, the Portuguese outpost at Luzon in the
Philippines, and the Joseon dynasty on the Korean peninsula. The focus was placed on those
with Joseon as they were the most extensive and because the war would eventually be fought on
the Korean peninsula. Of the former two, Hideyoshi sent word to both of his plans to invade the
Ming and demanded their allegiance and support in the coming war. Of these, the Portuguese
responded affirmatively, offering to send two warships and crews to man them;3 Ryūkyū, being a
loyal tributary state of the Ming, immediately sent word to the emperor.4 This message would
lead to mistrust arising between the Ming and Joseon due to the fact that the Joseon court would
be delayed in sending word themselves due to factional disagreements.
The narratives of the exchanges between the Joseon court and Hideyoshi in this period
contain many of the most serious conflicts in the contemporary sources here considered. In 1586
Hideyoshi ordered the lord of Tsuhima, Sō Yoshishige (1532-1588), to send an envoy to Korea
with a message. Sources vary on the exact message that was sent, 5 but it likely called for the
Joseon court to send an envoy to Japan without overt statements about plans for war. However,
between the rudeness of the head envoy, the arrogant language in which the letter was written,
and the Joseon court’s belief that Hideyoshi had committed regicide (a serious moral offense at
2

Hideyoshi was probably referring to Southeast Asia.
Kitajima, 16.
4
Swope, 62.
5
Swope writes that the purpose was to inform them of his plans to invade Ming, as well as to ask them to be guides
on the road and to assist in the attack (Swope, 53); Kitajima states that Hideyoshi’s demand at this time was that
Joseon send an envoy to Japan or face retribution (Kitajima, 16); Hawley concurs with Kitajima, but adds that
Hideyoshi’s demand was specifically for a “tribute mission” and that Yoshishige changed the wording to “goodwill
mission” to make the message more palatable (Hawley, 78).
3
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this time), they ultimately declined to send the envoy, giving the excuse that they were uncertain
of the sea route.6
Hideyoshi, furious at the failure of his mission, executed the head of the envoy and his
entire family.7 Later, in March 1589, a second mission to was sent to Joseon, this time headed by
several figures who will become quite important later in the events of the war: Yoshishige’s heir
Sō Yoshitoshi (1568-1615), the monk-diplomat Keitetsu Genso (1537-1611), and Yanegawa
Shigenobu (d. 1605).8 Arriving in Seoul, Yoshitoshi attempted to counter their earlier excuse
about the uncertainty of the route by suggesting that he would personally lead the Joseon envoy
back to Kyoto. In response, the Joseon court stated that it would consider sending a mission to
Japan if Yoshitoshi were able to capture some wanted pirates and return them to face justice.
Yoshitoshi complied 9 and in September of 1589 the Joseon court finally agreed to send the
envoy, although the purpose was notably to congratulate Hideyoshi for unifying Japan rather
than to submit to him.
The account of the meeting between Hideyoshi and the envoy is perhaps one of the most
oft repeated: it was a brief and simple affair, after which Hideyoshi reported changed into
informal dress and wandered around the hall with his newborn child, who proceeded to urinate
on him in front of everyone. This lack of decorum scandalized the envoy, but what shocked them
more was the contents of Hideyoshi’s letter addressed to the Joseon king, which they would
receive some time later. Aside from again using extremely arrogant language, it unequivocally
6

Kitajima, 20.
Kitajima, 20. A notable discrepancy in the narrative here can be found in Swope’s account. He writes that
Hideyoshi sent 26 ships to probe the waters around Korea, that some skirmishes resulted, leading to a few deaths
and a sunken ship on the Korean side. He also writes of a second envoy to Joseon sent late in 1587 that was also
ignored (Swope, 53). Neither Hawley nor Kitajima mention these events.
8
Kitajima, 21.
9
Swope suggests that the people Yoshitoshi brought before the court may have not been the actual people that were
sought, (Swope, 54).
7

9

stated Hideyoshi’s plan to invade Ming, together with his demand that Joseon allow him to use
their roads, act as guides, and even to participate in the war. This letter led to great partisan
conflict in Seoul as the two main factions in the government debated how to respond, with one
side arguing that Hideyoshi would not really attack and the other advocating the necessity of
military preparation. Ultimately, some preparation was initiated, though it proved insufficient: in
the April of 1592, Hideyoshi’s armies landed at Busan and within a few short months had cut a
path across the peninsula to the Yalu River, the border between Joseon and Ming.
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Chapter 3: Itō Gingetsu and the Manifestly
Miraculous Taikō
The first writer considered here is one Itō Gingetsu, a prolific writer with more than 100
titles attributed to him in the National Diet Library of Japan’s catalogue.1 Despite the quantity of
his work, little information is readily available about him; however, he was born in 1874 and
died in 1944, hailed from Akita province, and was known as a commentator, novelist, and
newspaper reporter.2 According to the database Japan Knowledge, he is known for his unique
compositions and anti-modern attitude, and he wrote in a wide variety of genres, including
fiction, criticism, travel writings, and history. There is no indication that he was a formally
trained historian: according to one source, he quit middle school at the age of seventeen and
moved to Tokyo, and only after moving around to various parts of the city for ten years did he
become employed as a newspaper reporter,3 and no source suggests that he went back to school
for formal training as a historian. Given this information, one should view his writings about the
war as popular histories, a sort likely to reflect popular attitudes but perhaps less likely to strive
for the level objectivity that one might expect from academic work.
Three of Itō’s books that were published in the period 1905-1912 contain narratives and
arguments about the Imjin War: Japan, Country of the Sea (海国日本, 1905), A History of
Japanese Piracy (日本海賊史, 1906), and Hideyoshi in His Later Years (晩年の秀吉, 1911),
1

Many of this number are likely reprintings as the Diet Library database counts multiple editions as separate works;
however, even given that possibility, we can still conclude that his books were very popular if they were to have had
so many reprintings to yield such a large number in the database.
2
Kodansha, “伊藤銀月.”
3
Shibunkaku, 伊藤銀月.”
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which are examined in chronological order. None of these books take the invasion itself as a
central topic; however, each one does contain at least one chapter or section that deals with the
war specifically. Itō’s treatment of the war sets itself apart from most due to his difference in
emphasis – whereas most authors writing on the war concern themselves with the events on the
continent and the negotiations among Japan, Joseon, and the Ming, Itō focuses in the former two
of his books on naval concerns and in the latter work on the person of Hideyoshi himself. Given
this difference in emphasis, his narratives and arguments differ quite a lot from the others, both
of his contemporaries and ours. In general, his narratives contain unlikely claims, anti-Chinese
attitudes, and positive views of Hideyoshi.
The first of these books is entitled Japan, Country of the Sea, a history of Japan centered
around the country’s connection to the sea, and is a work with a clearly enunciated bent towards
the idea of Japanese exceptionalism and is anticipates the nihonjinron genre. As suggested by the
title, the underlying thesis of this book is what he sees as the unique characteristics of the
Japanese people deriving from their proximity to the sea. He writes, “The land of Japan came to
be according to what? The character of the Japanese people was created according to what? A
particular thing must arise from a particular thing – if there is a result there must of necessity be
a cause. It is in order that I shall make clear this cause that I write Japan, Country of the Sea.”4
Though he stops short of saying explicitly, the implication is clear: the Japanese people are
particular – read: exceptional – and this exceptionality arises from the sea. This aim strongly
shapes his discussion of the Imjin War, in which he focuses exclusively on naval concerns, with
an emphasis on tactics and technology. Japan, Country of the Sea does not consider Hideyoshi or

4
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the prelude to the war and therefore will not be considered further. It does, however, provide
evidence for Itō’s nationalism.
The next book is A History of Japanese Piracy, published one year later. True to its
namesake, this book details the activities of Japanese pirates (JP wakō, KR waegu, CH wōkòu)
from the legendary foundation of the Japanese state until the Edo period, with emphasis on
individual personages and their own pirate activities or their connection to piracy in general. One
might question why a book about piracy would contain a chapter dealing with Hideyoshi’s
invasions of Korea since scholars today consider it a military action. Although Itō himself does
not answer this question directly, his reasoning is apparent in his choice of terminology: he
consistently uses the Korean designation for the war, waeran (JP waran 倭亂), which literally
translates as “Japanese disturbance,” but which historically refers to pirate raids. In contrast,
other Japanese sources written around the same time (and many today as well) tend to refer to
the invasion as shinryaku (invasion, 侵略), seifuku (conquest, 征服), or seibatsu (punitive
expedition, 征伐). Thus, in referring to Hideyoshi’s invasion by this term, Itō’s reasoning
becomes clear: the Imjin War is classed with pirate raids as a Japanese attack on the mainland
rather than a separate category of event, as contemporary historians tend to designate it.
Itō’s narrative of the war takes a very different orientation in this book than in his
previous book: whereas the first book focused on technological and tactical concerns, this one
considers the question of responsibility, and in so doing reveals a critical view of China.
According to Itō, the blame for the war falls squarely on the shoulders of the Ming dynasty,
asserting that they gave an affront to Hideyoshi that enraged him such that retribution was
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natural.5 According to Itō, at some point in the late 16th century (no date is provided, but it likely
would have occurred after 1582, when Hideyoshi succeeded his predecessor Oda Nobunaga), the
Ming government ordered Hideyoshi to suppress piracy and Hideyoshi responded by issuing an
edict to put that command into effect.6 According to Itō, Hideyoshi was completely successful,
writing, “The Taikō’s thunderous roar caused all the pirates of Japan to hold their breath, making
the Chinese continent to be free for the first time from the anxiety of pirate raids (倭亂).”7 From
here, his tone turns indignant.
The Ming ruler was pleased, and for this reason he gave thanks to the jiāomiào (郊廟)8
and received the praise of crowds of his subjects; but how is it that he did not direct a
single word of thanks to us? The fact that not a second pirate raid (waran, 倭亂) arrived
was not by the grace of their jiāomiào but the grace of our Highness the Taikō. Thanking
the jiāomiào, which lacked any miraculous efficacy and not thanking His Highness the
manifestly miraculous Taikō – what an affront! […] Well, regarding that affair, like a
demon god [Hideyoshi] raised a fearful great raid (dai-waran, 大倭亂) ten times that of a
[normal] raid, and truly the dreadfulness of the Japanese would penetrate to marrow of
the bone, and make them not forget the error of having scorned us.9
Itō’s narrative, then, is clear: the Ming ordered Hideyoshi to suppress piracy, Hideyoshi did so,
the Ming offered no thanks for his efforts, and so he set out to punish them. Beyond this, he has
nothing more to say on the topic.
The narrative that Itō provides here is immediately suspect to one who is familiar with
contemporary scholarship on this topic. Of the sources overviewed in Chapter 2, none mention

Itō himself stops short of saying “natural” explicitly; however, his language implies that he sees no problem with
Hideyoshi’s response – that is to say, he gives no negative judgment to it.
6
Itō, Japanese Piracy, 116.
7
Ibid., 119.
8
The word jiāomiào carries a variety of possible meanings and it is not readily apparent which one Itō is intending
here, so I have left the word untranslated. According to one dictionary, this word may refer to the location where the
Chinese emperor worships and makes sacrifices to Heaven and Earth or to his ancestors, but it could by association
also refer to the act of such worship or even just to the polity of the state. Given Itō’s negative attitude toward China,
it seems reasonable to assume that he his indicating worship of the occult, but this is difficult to conclude with
certainty.
9
Ibid., 119.
5
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either a Ming command to end piracy, nor do they mention Hideyoshi’s suppression of piracy or
his ire at not receiving thanks for it.10 Hawley and Swope consider Hideyoshi’s motivations at
length, but do not mention piracy.11 Swope in particular, being a scholar of Ming China, would
be in the best position to have some awareness of such a command on the part of the Ming, so
that fact that he does not mention it provides even more reason to suspect the veracity of this
narrative. One further place to look for any mention of this would be Hideyoshi’s own writings,
yet of the sources listed by both Hawley and Kitajima, none mention precisely why China was
his ultimate goal. Given the lack of support in contemporary scholarship, Itō’s claim is doubtful.
There are two ways that to read Itō’s narrative. On the one hand, one may assume it to be
a complete fabrication, a flight of fancy perhaps or just an inference that he made without regard
to the sources. On the other, one may give him the benefit of the doubt and surmise that he had
access to sources that scholars today do not. In Itō’s favor, the extant sources do not offer any
explicit explanations of Hideyoshi’s reasoning, leaving scholars to speculate as to why he
decided to engage in a foreign invasion. It may therefore be a useful project for scholars of the
Imjin War to investigate his claims. A good start would be to locate the edict that Hideyoshi
supposedly issued for pirate suppression, which Itō quotes directly in the book, 12 and also to
search for any record of the Ming command supposedly issued to Hideyoshi calling him to
suppress the pirates. That said, there is ample evidence to cast doubt upon this narrative as well.
First and foremost, there is the question of timing. The edict that Itō quotes regarding pirate
suppression is dated to the year Tenshō 27, or 1589 – four years after Hideyoshi’s first recorded
statements about invading the Ming. If one accepts, then, that Hideyoshi was already planning to
Robinson, for example, includes an entire section on piracy in his essay “Violence, Trade, and Imposters,” but
makes no mention of such a command from the Ming or any mention of any pirate suppression that Hideyoshi might
have done (Robinson 2015).
11
Swope, 63-67; Hawley, 22-25.
12
See Itō, Japanese Piracy, 116.
10

15

invade the Ming in 1585, one cannot claim that the Ming’s failure to praise him for his
suppression of pirates in 1589 be anything more than an excuse, assuming that there is any truth
to this claims at all. If one were to believe that Hideyoshi’s motivation was what Itō says it was,
then Hideyoshi must have received the command at least several years before 1585 in order to
have had time to issue the edict, enforce it, and then to have given up waiting for thanks. Seeing
as Hideyoshi had not finished uniting Japan until the 1591 Kyushu expedition, it is further
questionable whether, even if the Ming did send such a message, they would have known who to
send it to. Still, even if this is an unsatisfactory explanation for Hideyoshi’s desire to invade,
such a command may still have been issued and by some fashion it may have been passed to him,
and the edict quoted in the text may also be authentic; as these details would be relevant context
for the war and given the fact that no mention of them appears in contemporary narratives, it
therefore still a worthwhile project to investigate.
Regarding the question of blame for the war, from what we have seen Itō clearly places
the onus on the Ming for not thanking Hideyoshi for suppressing piracy and excuses Hideyoshi’s
invasion by implying that it was justified. The place of Korea in this narrative, however, is
minimal, in spite of the fact that it was the land that was devastated by two invasions. All that he
does is give a cursory explanation as to why Korea was involved at all. He writes, “As for the
fact that he first faced Joseon, it was just to try to penetrate from the main gate (正門) and drive
off the guards.”13 In other words, it was only that Joseon stood between Hideyoshi and the Ming
– it was not because Joseon themselves had done any wrong nor was it that Hideyoshi harbored
any ill will toward them. In this narrative, then, Korea is peripheral, hardly worthy of discussion
at all.

13
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In sum, in this book Itō presents a rather dubious but nonetheless unique perspective on
the war. He provides a narrative that is unlike anything found at other works either of his
contemporaries or of ours, and given the facts contained in more recent narratives, his claims
about Hideyoshi’s motivations are almost certainly false, though some substance of the narrative
may be true but unconfirmed as yet. Next, however, we turn to his 1911 book, Hideyoshi in His
Later Years (晩年の秀吉), in which he expands upon what he presented in his this book.
Hideyoshi in His Later Years is part three of a three part biography of Hideyoshi,
including the titles Hideyoshi in His Early Years (青年の秀吉) and Hideyoshi in His Middle
Years (中年の秀吉). In the introduction to the first book in the series, Itō presents this biography
as an answer to the writings that came before – specifically, he says that he intends to write a
history that moves beyond the legends and stories to find historical truth, interestingly echoing
Kuwata Tadachika’s characterization of Meiji period writings on Hideyoshi, written some forty
years later.14 As we shall see from his discussion of the Imjin War contained in Hideyoshi in His
Later Years, which covers his exploits from the subjugation of Kyushu in 1587 until his death in
1598, he indeed continues to express concern for historical fact, but we can nonetheless see a
narrative tainted with nationalist sentiments and questionable analysis.
In this book Itō, for all his talk about searching for historical fact, nonetheless continues
his habit from earlier books of speaking of Hideyoshi in glowing terms (recall his words from
History of Japanese Piracy: “his Highness the manifestly miraculous Taikō”). This is evidenced
by his frequent use of words incorporating the character yū (雄), which indicates superiority or
excellence with associations to masculinity, to describe Hideyoshi and his actions. To name just
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a few, he refers to Hideyoshi as a great man (英雄), he is possesses a heroic spirit (雄心), and his
plot to invade Korea is a grand plan (雄圖). Beyond this terminology, he also has a tendency to
wax poetic, as we see in the introduction of Hideyoshi in His Later Years, in which he likens the
last years of his life to bright and windy winter evening, a beautiful scene replete with red, gold,
and purple colors – an interesting choice to describe a man who would command the armies that
would kill, according to some estimates, a tenth of the Korean population. 15 This adulatory
language signals immediately that the reader should be wary of bias, a necessity that is born out
in his discussion of the Imjin War.
Turning to the chapter of this book that concerns the war, entitled “Hideyoshi’s Deeds as
a Great Man” (英雄としての秀吉の事業), Itō provides a much more detailed narrative that
incorporates and expands upon what he wrote in Japanese Piracy. The focus of this chapter, as
in the earlier book, is on the causes for the war and, as before, he does repeat the claim that
Hideyoshi invaded because the Ming refused to thank him for suppressing piracy. However,
while this claim was the primary reason listed, in this book he considers it only as a subsidiary
reason among many others. In the course of the chapter he considers three explanations for
Hideyoshi’s motivation for the war, offers criticism of each, and then provides his own
explanation. This explanation, as illustrated below, casts the invasion as the result of natural
processes rather than as the result of the Ming emperor have spurned Hideyoshi.
Itō’s criticism deals with three explanations of Hideyoshi’s motivations for his invasions.
The first of these is an obviously lengendarized tale regarding the birth and death of Hideyoshi’s
beloved heir. So the story goes, Hideyoshi was elated at the birth of his son, but upon the child’s
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death less than a year later, he was beset by such sadness that he abdicated the position of taikō
(regent) and retired as kampaku (chief advisor). However, looking out on the four compass
directions from a high place while on a pilgrimage to Kiyomizu, his heroic spirit (雄心) suddenly
returned and he determined to engage in his life’s greatest work – the invasion of Ming.16 The
second explanation is that Hideyoshi believed that after so many years of warfare, the people of
Japan were infused with a savage spirit (殺伐の気) and so were not ready for peace. In order
exhaust that spirit and allow peace in Japan, he sent his armies abroad. 17 The third explanation is
that, since contact between Japan, Korea, and the continent [i.e. China] had historically been
strong (between trade and pirate raids), Japan had a good understanding of the situation on the
mainland: namely, Korea was a weak country that would go down with one blow, and that China
was large and apparently formidable, yet weak.18 According to this narrative, author writes, in
these circumstances Hideyoshi’s plan to invade was only following the natural course of events
(自然の勢いに順う).19
Itō, however, is critical of each of these explanations – as well he should be – though his
criticisms can be elaborated on and further corrected in the light of contemporary scholarship.
Regarding the first reason he cited, we should first note that none of the contemporary scholars
cited in this essay include such an explanation, indicating that they either are not aware of it or
do not take it as a serious possibility. Itō himself criticizes it, suggesting that it originated in
Tokugawa period as an attempt to weaken Hideyoshi’s image; although this interpretation is
difficult to verify, it does match with Kuwata Tadachika’s evaluation of Edo period writings. As
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he notes in his study of historical sources about Hideyoshi, Research on the Records of the Taikō,
it was not uncommon for official documents to attempt to diminish his legacy.20 Given the nature
of the story, which on the surface does strike one as being much more intimate than a typical
record would be, a search for the origin of this story should begin in the Tokugawa period. It is
reasonable, in the absence of additional evidence, to concur with Itō that this explanation is
likely a fabrication. In this case, his concern for historical truth is supported.
The second point he dismisses rather briefly, saying only that “it is an old-fashioned
observation that is only reasoned out [i.e. without tangible evidence].”21 This is curious criticism
for two reasons. In the first place, he is certainly right to suggest that it is old fashioned (舊式):
Swope includes a similar explanation in his list of motivations attributed to Hideyoshi during the
Edo period, though in his characterization it was more about “weakening rivals and exhausting
their fighting strength” rather than a need to pacify the people of Japan as a whole. 22 However,
old-fashioned as it may be, only this explanation in any way resembles explanations that
contemporary scholars seriously consider today. Swope and Hawley, for example, gives a similar
explanation, reasoning that Hideyoshi’s strategy of winning rival daimyo to his side by offering
rewards of land would lead to dissatisfaction and possible revolt once no more land remained to
offer; for this reason, they suggest, Hideyoshi extended his conquest to foreign lands in order to
continue providing such rewards.23 True to Itō’s criticism of his version of this explanation, these
recent positions are nothing more than the result of logical speculation – neither author cites any
sources to confirm, but only makes educated guesses based on their knowledge of the
circumstances. Regardless, in the interest of Imjin War narratives, this particular explanation is
20
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noteworthy for its staying power – although the particulars have evolved over the years, similar
explanations have been considered reasonable over centuries of scholarship. It appears, then, that
Itō was somewhat hasty in dismissing it, though his criticism is still certainly valid.
As for the third explanation, in contrast to the second, Itō does show some affirmative,
albeit limited, support and yet it has some serious problems that he does not acknowledge. To
reiterate, this one held that Hideyoshi was aware of the weakness of Ming and Joseon and it was
therefore only natural that he attack. Regarding Itō’s own support and criticism, he writes that “it
is such that we could call it a new-style historian’s24 perspective,” but in the next stroke of his
pen says that “it can do no more than paint a silhouette.”25 If Itō means that this is only a small
part of the whole story, then this is valid as an influence on Hideyoshi’s decision although be
more accurate one must amend his position by stating that Hideyoshi may have at least thought
that these two were weak since it is unclear exactly how accurate his knowledge was, especially
in the case of the Ming (he certainly learned something of the state of Joseon from his envoys
starting in the late 1580s).
Contemporary scholarship does indicate that the internal conditions of Joseon did make
the kingdom susceptible to invasion, and though scholars disagree about the degree of weakness
in of the Ming, it too is thought to have been in a weak state as well,26 but how much Hideyoshi
actually knew and how accurate that information was is an open question. Contemporary
scholars have not given much attention to this topic, but later in this chapter, Itō himself does
provide one piece of supporting evidence for the extent of Hideyoshi’s knowledge: a report
By “new-style historian,” Itō is referring to the Western style of historiography popularized in Japan during the
Meiji period that emphasized the search for historical fact based on evidence and eschewing the liberties that earlier
writers took when writing about historical topics.
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brought to him by a former pirate. According to Itō, this man told Hideyoshi that, “Ming fears
Japan as it would a tiger. I think it would be even easier to take that country than it would be to
overturn your palm.” 27 Both Hawley and Swope reference this same text, so it would be
reasonable to assume that this story is credible, but given Hideyoshi’s failure, the pirate’s
testimony was not credible. That said, if we amend the argument to the point of saying merely
that Hideyoshi thought that Ming was weak, then indeed this explanation may be valid, but only
insofar as Itō himself qualifies this argument: it is just a small part of the bigger picture.
These three explanations are consistent with the narrative Itō presented previously in A
History of Japanese Piracy. If we recall, in that work, the cause of the war was attributed to
Hideyoshi’s desire to chastise the Ming for failing to thank him for putting an end to the pirate
raids (a charge which he also repeats briefly later in the chapter). 28 If we take these four
explanations together, two common features are apparent. First, they all center on the person of
Hideyoshi and they all emphasize Ming as the target. In the first case, Hideyoshi, though
portrayed in a very human fashion, nonetheless has his heroic spirit awakened by a beautiful
view, inspiring him to do his life’s great work. In the second, the decision is because of his
shrewdness as a leader of Japan. In the third case, it is because he possessed knowledge of his
neighbors’ weakness and hoped to exploit it. Finally, in the last case, Hideyoshi executes a
chastisement for the sake of punishing a slight against Japan. Each of these, then, can be
categorized under the Great Man Theory of history, and they all in their own way emphasize
Hideyoshi the person over other explanations. This emphasis on Hideyoshi promotes an image of
Japan as a powerful nation: Hideyoshi is the subject that acts upon others but is not acted upon.
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There is, of course, one problem with emphasizing Hideyoshi’s agency in the light of
Meiji period politics: though it does emphasize Japan’s status as a great nation vicariously
through Hideyoshi, it does run the risk of casting a negative light upon the country by suggesting
that they were barbaric, warlike aggressors. However, Itō’s narrative does contain elements to
exonerate Japan of this possible charge. In A History of Japanese Piracy, Itō suggests that
Hideyoshi was justified in his assault on the Ming because they insulted him; in explanation
three in Hideyoshi in His Later Years, we see another such example when he suggests that
Hideyoshi was only following the natural course of events. However, as noted, Itō does think
that all of these explanations miss the big picture. His explanation of this, as we shall see, will
further deemphasize Japanese culpability.
What then, in Itō’s mind, is the bigger picture? In his estimation, all three of the
explanations are not incompatible with each other, but he believes that they can all be
“reconciled and harmonized” under a broader explanation, and that being what he calls the “The
Principle of Japanese Nation Building” (日本建国の主義). 29 He explains this principle as
follows:
“At times when the nation (国家) possess even a little surplus power, without fail it faces
outward and carries out that principle. Even if the time is not one in which the nation
possesses surplus power, if perhaps the people (国民) possess [such] surplus power,
again without fail they face outward and fragmentarily carry out that principle. We can
grasp this by the activities of our pirates against the continent and peninsula. Indeed, we
must also deem Hideyoshi as well as having raised up the nation (国家) and made them
issue forth grandly while following this trend.30
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In his perspective then, Japanese aggression against neighboring countries is the product of a
natural process, outside the control of individuals – when Japan or anyone in Japan happens to
have power, that power unavoidably pours outwards against Korea and China. One salient
difference between this position and the earlier three is the question of responsibility. In all three
of the earlier explanations, Hideyoshi possesses full agency and therefore fully responsible for
the war. By making the invasion nothing more than a process of nature, it takes on the quality of
a natural disaster, like an earthquake or a tsunami, rather than an act executed by a human being.
This yet again takes focus away from Hideyoshi as the aggressor while at the same time
preserving Hideyoshi’s status as a great man: it was only natural that Hideyoshi extend his power
outward, but it was precisely because he had that power that he did so.
One final note before concluding this study of Itō’s writings is to note two additional
motivations, which he mentions briefly at the end of this chapter. The first is that he was seeking
retribution for the attempted invasion of Japan by the Yuan dynasty several centuries before, and
also to reassert his claim from the previous book regarding the supposed Ming slight of not
thanking him for putting an end to piracy.31 He does, however, further assert that this was his
greatest motivation for wanting to invade.32 We can only speculate as to why he includes these
two reasons so late in the chapter and with so little explanation – indeed, they seem to be barely
more than an afterthought – but they nonetheless should be acknowledged. Little more needs to
be said about the latter of these two explanations than what has already been written in this
chapter, but regarding the Yuan invasion, the earliest reference was recorded in 1591 in The
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Revised True Record of Seonjo of Joseon Dynasty (朝鮮王朝宣祖正実録).33 In this account, the
Japanese monk Keitetsu Genso cites this as a reason for Hideyoshi’s invasion when questioned
by a Joseon official while he was acting as an ambassador in Seoul. This position, noted in
contemporary scholarship, is not considered seriously as a reason for the war and was likely
fabricated by Genso. The uncritical inclusion of this dubious explanation is consistent with Itō’s
tendency to shift blame away from Hideyoshi, as we have seen him do repeatedly in this chapter.
To conclude, Itō Gingetsu’s narratives conflict with each other, asserting on the one hand
that the war was a justified response to Chinese actions, and on the other characterizing the
invasion the result of a natural process. The common thread between these, however, is that they
de-emphasizes Japanese responsibility for the war. In the former variety, Hideyoshi is justified
because Japan was slighted; in the latter, Japan is not responsible because the invasions were the
result of natural processes. Finally, another common aspect is the lack of emphasis put on
Korea’s role in the war: the peninsula is hardly mentioned at all in these discussions, except to
assert that this was not the target. As we shall see, these positions were fairly common at this
time.
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Chapter 4: Kemuyama Sentarō
Next is Kemuyama Sentarō, an academic figure who sets quite a contrast to the popular
writer Itō. Born in Iwate Prefecture in 1877, he studied both history and philosophy at Tokyo
Imperial University (now Tokyo University), eventually graduating with a degree in philosophy.
That same year he accepted a position at Waseda University, where he lectured on modern
Western history and political history for more than four decades.1 During his career he wrote
many books on a variety of topics, including the one that we shall consider here, The True
Affairs of the Invade Korea Debate, published in 1907.
As with Itō’s works, in writing The True Affairs, Kemuyama Sentarō’s primary concern
is not the Imjin War; in this case, the topic is the seikanron, or Invade Korea Debate. This debate
arose in 1873 when the leadership of the recently established Meiji government debated whether
or not they should invade Korea as a response to a diplomatic affront. Some, including the head
of the government Saigō Takamori, advocated responding with force; others, such as Okubo
Toshimichi advocated that the government could not sustain a war and so should ignore the
affront. In the end, though, the peace faction prevailed and the invasion was averted.2 Although
many studies of the events surrounding the seikanron exist today, at the time that Kemuyama
was writing his book, many details remained unclear, and for this reason he wrote the book. In
doing so, he goes beyond the immediate events, tracing its context to the earliest recorded history
of Japan, summarizing Japan’s relations with its neighbors and explaining how this history
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played into the debate and its outcome. Although the book only briefly discusses Hideyoshi and
his invasions, his treatment of this nonetheless shows inconsistencies with the historical record,
providing a narrative of the event that absolves both Japan and Korea for the war, tacitly placing
the blame on Ming China.
The following is a translation of the relevant section.
As soon as he unified the realm (天下), Toyotomi Hideyoshi, desiring to make new ties
with foreign countries, dispatched Tachibana Yasuhiro, a man of Tsushima, to Korea (韓
国) to demand tribute and, moreover, ordered him to endeavor toward friendship with the
Ming. However, when they did not obey, Hideyoshi dispatched Sō Yoshitoshi, Yanegawa
Shigenobu, and the monk Genso, who then persuaded them with great care. In the end,
[Korea] yielded, treating our envoy cordially and also appointing a return envoy to come
to Japan and apologize.… However, when the Ming had not yet repaired friendly
relations with us, Hideyoshi, in a return letter given to the Joseon king, wrote that,
supposing that the Ming do not want to repair relations with us, Japan must pass through
Korea and in great numbers enter that country. As for Joseon, they should lead out of
necessity. Because of this, the king was greatly afraid and secretly raised an army, which
resulted in prompting the peninsular expeditions of our Bunroku (1592-6) and Keichō
(1596-1615) eras.3
As we can see, Kemuyama uses much more restrained language than Itō. If we recall from the
previous chapter, Itō had a tendency to use stronger, more inflammatory language when speaking
of China, referring to them derisively, implying misconduct for failing to thank Hideyoshi for
suppressing piracy, and the like, and further he heaped praise on Hideyoshi, using worshipful
language to describe him. In contrast, in the above paragraph we see a dispassionate recitation of
the events, without strong, emotionally charged language. That said, we still see a narrative that
departs from contemporary narratives at key points in such as to place blame on the Ming, soften
Japanese-Korean relations, and mischaracterize Hideyoshi’s stated intentions.
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Regarding the construction of the narrative, Kemuyama, as with Itō, absolves Japan and
Korea of responsibility and leaves the fault of the war on the shoulders of the Ming. Consider
first how he writes of Japan’s involvement in the conflict. At the outset, he tells us, Hideyoshi
simply desired to make new ties with foreign states and, especially, wanted friendship with the
Ming dynasty in China; he was, however, rebuffed despite his supposedly benign intentions.
Such a rebuff, we can imagine, would have been considered an insult to Japan; after all, the
seikanron, the very subject of the book, was touched off by a similar rebuff from Korea. 4 Yet,
there is no mention of perceived insult here; rather, the author simply tells us that Hideyoshi
dispatched a second mission, whose members “persuaded with great care” (具に諭す). A
response with force only became necessary when the Ming continued to refuse Hideyoshi’s good
offices – that is, Hideyoshi, in this narrative, appears to have shown restraint in not seeking to
punish the Ming until after repeatedly being rejected. Through this narrative of events, the author
tacitly puts responsibility for the war on the Ming, implying that, if they had only entered into
friendly relations with him, no war would have happened. As we shall see later, however, this
narrative of events runs counter to the prevailing narratives.
The narrative that the author presents here also notably absolves Korea of responsibility.
Despite not obeying Hideyoshi’s wishes at first, the he makes a point of noting that the second
envoy was treated “cordially” (篤く), and that the Koreans sent a return envoy to apologize for
the earlier rebuff, in effect settling whatever insult they may have given to Japan in the first place.
The army that the Koreans raised against the Japanese, he further notes, was not because they
had any explicit desire to fight Japan but rather because they were afraid of the large number of
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Japanese troops passing through – that is, their resistance was an understandable response. In this
way, both Japan and Korea are absolved of any wrongdoing.
Kemuyama’s narrative, though more restrained than Itō’s, also contains questionable
elements, the first and most glaring of these being his implication that Hideyoshi desired to make
ties with the Ming and that the war was a result of their refusal. However, as discussed in chapter
2 of this essay, there is ample evidence that Hideyoshi intended an invasion of the Ming years
before he had even completed subjugating the provinces of Japan. Kitajima Manji, for example,
cites a total of five separate documents in which Hideyoshi expresses his intention to invade. The
first of these, the Itsuyanagi Document (一柳文書), dates to 1585, seven years before the
beginning of the war; in it, Kitajima writes, Hideyoshi “states his intention of a conquest of the
Ming to his trusted retainer (腹心) Officer Hitotsunagi Sueyasu.” In the next document, a letter
to the Jesuit priest Gaspar Coelho dated to 1586, Hideyoshi announces a plan to subjugate the
Ming and Joseon Korea. Following this, Kitajima cites the House Mōri Document (毛利家文章)
and the Kuroda Document (黒田文章); these reveal that, in 1587, Hideyoshi indicated to three
separate prominent figures “that they should be prepared for crossing the sea to Joseon and
invading the Ming.” One more document, the Myōmanji Document (妙満寺文章), also dated to
1587, records several of Hideyoshi’s announcements to his wife, Kita no Mandokoro (also
known as O-ne), that, among other things, “I will command the Joseon king to enter Japan and
visit the capital; if the king refuses to come, [I] will punish him next year; and as long as [I] still
live, [I] will bring the country of Ming into my grasp.”5
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If this evidence were insufficient, there is the direct text of the “return letter” Hideyoshi
sent back to Joseon after the Korean envoy finally came to Japan, which Kemuyama refers to in
the section quoted from his book above. To review, Kemuyama characterizes the contents of this
letter as follows: “supposing that the Ming do not want to repair relations with us, Japan must
pass through Korea and in great numbers enter Ming.”6 The actual contents of the letter though,
contradict these very details that Kemuyama includes. Following Kitajima’s translation into
modern Japanese, the text reads as follows: “However, I (Hideyoshi) am not satisfied with [just
the subjugation of Japan]. Despite the fact that Japan is separated from Ming by mountains and
oceans, I am thinking I shall enter that great country, impose Japanese customs upon the 400-odd
states of the Middle Country (China), and plant Japanese rule for eternity.”7 As this indicates, not
only did Hideyoshi plan to invade Ming from the start, the way that Kemuyama characterizes the
contents of the letter – namely, by adding the conditional phrase “supposing that the Ming do not
want to repair relations,” suggesting that the invasion was the result of the Ming failing to do this
– contrasts with the actual contents. That is, in the actual letter, Hideyoshi states with no
uncertainty that he intends to invade Ming, without providing any necessary condition. Given the
above evidence, Kemuyama was either ignorant of this evidence or intentionally misrepresenting
the historical record. In absence of an overt explanation on Kemuyama’s part, the reason he
misrepresented these facts remains unclear. Whatever the reason, the narrative as he presents it
has the effect of minimizing Hideyoshi’s, and by association Japan’s, status as an aggressor,
similar to what appears in Itō’s Hideyoshi in His Later Years.
An interesting contrast to Kemuyama’s treatment of Hideyoshi’s relations with Joseon is
his treatment of Hideyoshi’s interactions with Ryūkyū. As noted above, the treatment of the
6
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origins of the war with Korea de-emphasizes either country’s responsibility and also uses only
positive or neutral language to describe Korea – Korea treated the Japanese envoy “cordially,”
they sent a return envoy for the purposes of giving an apology, and they only fought Japan
because they were afraid of having Japanese troops march through their land. However, when we
examine his treatment of Ryūkyū, we see overtly critical language appearing. Regarding Ryūkyū,
he writes as follows:
Due to [Ryūkyū s estrangement from Japan], no sooner than Hideyoshi had unified the
country (天下), he appointed Kamei Korenori as Viceroy (守) of of the islands and had
him plan an expedition, though in the end this was not carried out. In the Bunroku period
(1592-6), while he was sending forth the force to invade Korea, he also commanded to
Shimazu Yoshihisa to make Ryūkyū provide foodstuffs; not obeying, [Ryūkyū] sought
help from the Ming. Though the Shimazu clan rebuked this rudeness, [Ryūkyū] did not
listen. Regarding the Ryukyu's worship of strength, [the Shimazu clan], more than not
waking [Ryūkyū] up from that stubbornness by means of force, in the end had no chance
to smash this [worship].”8
Near the end of this quotation, Kemuyama uses critical language to refer to the island kingdom.
For example, he describes Ryūkyū’s refusal to provide foodstuffs as “rudeness” (無禮) and the
subsequent refusal comply as “obstinacy” (頑迷). Further, Ryūkyū’s decision to side with the
Ming is attributed to “worship of the strong” (事大主義). According to Charles Armstrong, this
term, though originating in the philosophy of Mencius as a pragmatic stance for small countries
to survive next to larger ones, began to take on a pejorative meaning in 20th century Korea.9
Though it is uncertain whether the term carried the same connotation in Japanese, given the
preceding use of the terms “rudeness” and “obstinacy” in refusing to comply with Japan,
Kemuyama’s usage here does suggest a pejorative connotation. This contrasts significantly with
the language he used to describe Korea, in which he explicitly uses language to portray that
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country in a more positive light, further indicating that his language regarding Korea was
intentional, not incidental.
Examining the context of Japan’s relations with Korea and Ryukyu in 1907 (the year of
publication), a possible explanation for this difference in attitudes becomes apparent. At that
time, Ryūkyū had been under Japanese control since 1879, whereas Korea had only just become
a protectorate in 1905, two years before. Though it may be too much to claim that his critical
language regarding Ryūkyū’s refusal to join Japan in the war has any tangible connection to the
fact that Japan’s control of Ryūkyū was assured at the time of writing whereas it was not with
Korea, the coincidence is nonetheless noteworthy. A further possible explanation is that
Kemuyama viewed Ryūkyū more as a rebellious Japanese island while on the other hand viewed
Korea as a separate sovereign state, worthy of respect. It is difficult to say with certainty what
motivated him to write in this way; suffice to say, the discrepancy in his attitudes between the
two should be noted.
Kemuyama’s True Affairs of the Invade Korea Debate, we can summarize as follows.
First, Kemuyama does not at the outset of his work take an obviously biased stance. That said, he
presents a narrative that directly contradicts evidence from relevant historical documents.
Compared to Itō, although Kemuyama does provide a more spare and restrained account of the
events, lacking in the overtly critical attitudes, he nonetheless shows similar biases in his lack of
attention to Korea and his tendency to blame the Ming.
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Chapter 5: Okuda Naoki
Compared to the other writers discussed here, very little information is available about
Okuda Naoki. No references to him could be found by searching for his name in English, and
searching in Japanese yielded nothing but the fact that he lived from 1875 to 1942 and that he
wrote a few books, such as a photo collection of the Meiji emperor as well as a collection of
essays predominantly about the Imjin War, which is the subject of this chapter. A search of his
name in Korean, however, did yield one result – an essay about Japanese travel writers in Korea
during the mid-1910s. The information contained in the abstract reveals that he was a reporter at
the Seoul Daily newspaper (京城日報), but little more.1 Despite the lack of information about
him, this one detail is sets him apart from the other writers – he is the only one who actually
lived in Korea. As we shall see, compared to Ito and Kemuyama, he portrays the events of the
war in far greater detail, providing a narrative every bit as comprehensive as contemporary
narratives and every bit as factual; however, his interpretation of these facts reveals a biased
attitude toward Hideyoshi as he takes pains to portray him in a positive light.
Okuda’s book, Ancient Traces of Korea and Japan, is a collection of essays, originally
published individually in the Seoul Daily, that cover topics on Japanese-Korean relations
throughout recorded history. The book itself is quite lengthy, totaling in well over five hundred
pages, and contains forty essays in total. This chapter analyzes two of them: “The Failure of
Japanese-Korean Negotiations” and “Hideyoshi’s Scheme to Provoke Disorder.” Of these two,
the former is an account of the period of negotiations between Hideyoshi’s administration and
1
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the Joseon court in the years preceding the outbreak of the conflict and the latter argues that the
distrust that arose between the Ming and Joseon was part of Hideyoshi over-arching war plan.
Before considering these essays, however, an examination of the prefaces of the book provides a
view into the author’s position regarding the subject matter of the book.
The book contains two prefaces, the first by one Nagao Ōoka (presumably his senior at
the Seoul Daily, though his relation to the company is not clear) and the second by Okuda
himself; both reveal their attitudes towards the annexation of Korea and by proxy Korea itself.
First, the language that both uses strongly implies that the annexation was both natural and
correct, and they connect this idea to the relationship of the two countries across time. In
Nagao’s case, he gives an overview of Japanese-Korean relations from ancient times on,
characterizing these relations as both close and friendly, writing, for example, that “there was
hardly an emperor from Jimmu (660 BCE – 585)2 to Jitō (686 – 697 CE) who didn’t have some
connection to Korea,” and claiming that the two countries exchanged tribute missions starting in
the reign of emperor Sujin, concluding that “is there not the sense that the three kingdoms [of
Korea] in those times were affiliated as a single territory in Japanese history, and at the same
time were of one dominion under the true authority of an empire?” 3 Though admitting that
relations were not as strong in later years, he insists that the two countries still maintained close
contact. Though he stops short of connecting this directly to the annexation, the implication is
clear: there was a historical precedent for their current relationship.
Okuda himself goes into far less detail on the matter, but expresses a similar opinion, and
one that exhibits a much more disdainful attitude toward Korea. He characterizes Korea’s
These are dates for Jimmu’s reign according to Japanese tradition, but given his semi-mythical status, they should
not be taken as fact.
3
Ōka, “Introduction,” 2-3.
2
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relationship with its neighbors as fickle, writing that they “relied on the Ming in the morning and
sent tribute to us (Japan) in the evening.”4 He then asks rhetorically, “Is it therefore not unusual
that the fate of the peninsula to be situated under the Suzerain Authority of the Japanese
empire?”5 In this way he blames Korea for its current predicament, suggesting inferiority as the
cause. Most interestingly, he uses the term “suzerain authority” (宗主權) to describe the Japan’s
relationship with Korea. This is the word that typically described the tributary relationship
between Korea and China that existed through much of history. Choosing this term rather than
using the word “annex” (併合) has symbolic resonance. In the first place, it implies that Japan
had supplanted China in the East Asian world order, and in the second it implies that in this
relationship between the two, Japan is the superior. This contrasts with the legal term used to
describe the annexation, which merely indicates the fact that the two countries became one
without directly implying superiority of one party to the other.6
These positive attitudes towards the annexation should be forefront in one’s mind when
considering their attitudes towards Hideyoshi’s invasions he too sought to subjugate Korea to
Japan. Looking to their words, they do not explicitly endorse Hideyoshi’s project, but they do
express positive views of Hideyoshi and they do not condemn his actions. Nagao, for example,
refers to Hideyoshi’s invasion as a brilliant achievement (快挙),7 and Okuda himself expresses a
positive attitude toward Hideyoshi, making an effort to interpret him as a wily and cunning
leader.

Okuda, “Author’s Preface,” 1.
Ibid., 1.
6
Although it is true that the English word “annexation” does indicate one country as superior, the Japanese heigō
(併合) has a meaning closer to the English “merger.”
7
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Unlike Itō Gingetsu or Kemuyama Sentarō, Okuda at least has a proclivity to represent
historical fact as they are represented in historical documents. To give one example, recall that
both of those writers suggested that Hideyoshi’s invasion occurred because of a slight from the
Ming, in the former case a failure to give praise and in the latter a refusal to make political ties
(see chapters 3 and 4). Okuda, in contrast, cites only events that are verified in contemporary
scholarship and makes ample use of direct quotations, citing official letters between Hideyoshi
and the Joseon court, as well as Korean documents such as the Book of Corrections and others
that detail the controversies resulting from the Japanese envoys at this time. He also includes
many details that reflect poorly on Japan, details that none of the other sources discussed in this
essay mention, such as envoy Yasuhiro’s arrogant and rude behavior as well as envoy Sō
Yoshitoshi’s and also Hideyoshi’s lack of decorum when meeting with Joseon officials. Of all
the sources, then, we can say that this is the most factually accurate and complete narrative of the
negotiations with Joseon at the outset of the war.
That said, Okuda’s biases come out not through his narration of the events, but through
his interpretation of them – that is to say, he accurately portrays what we are mostly certain
happened given the sources, but these sources leave gaps that the historian must fill in order to
form a complete narrative. The art of history writing, one could say, is appropriately considering
the range of possibilities that might fill these gaps. In this respect, Okuda fails – his interpretation
of events rarely admits to alternative possibilities, but rather states his suppositions without
acknowledging the possibility of others. An good example of this arises from his view of
Hideyoshi, whose actions he consistently interprets in order to portray him cunning and brilliant
strategist, an image which we see created in two separate points.
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In the first point, there is Okuda’s portrayal of Hideyoshi’s motivations for the war. For
context, in the literature of Imjin War history, the list of possible motivations for the invasion is
quite long, ranging from the purely militaristic – desiring glory – to more practical concerns like
preventing internal turmoil or acquiring continental resources. As Swope’s overview indicates, 8
a wide variety of ideas had already been posited by the time that Okuda was writing, yet of all
the possibilities, he chooses the one that most strongly indicates Hideyoshi’s strategic prowess:
that Hideyoshi was attempting to prevent internal dissent. He writes:
“With the ferocious generals and brave warriors having gathered as one at his knee,
would all under Heaven at last come to peace? The Merciful Eye [of Buddha] upon him,
he had already discerned the state of the realm. Fearing more internal disorder if the
various generals were to grumble in their idleness having so quickly put away sword and
lance, in his heart he was secretly anxious. It is for this reason perhaps that he had to have
a clever scheme.”9
Okuda does make mention of a few other related factors. He cites practical concerns for choosing
Korea, for example, noting its proximity to Japan, being not a day from Tsushima, and
Tsushima’s close relationship to the Joseon court. In addition, he notes the death of Hideyoshi’s
beloved child – as did Itō – as well as the death of his half-brother Toyotomi Hidenaga, but only
suggests that these bereavements led him to advance the date of the invasion. 10 The central
reason, then, is only that Hideyoshi was smart enough to plan a head to prevent internal unrest,
the interpretation of events that makes him appear the most cunning.
Okuda’s presentation of Hideyoshi as a cunning strategist is his analysis of the distrust
that developed between Ming and Joseon prior to the war. Contemporary scholarship agrees with
the facts of the matter as Okuda presents them – Hideyoshi sent out calls for support to various

Kenneth M. Swope’s volume A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail gives a detailed overview of these
explanations, 63-67.
9
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8
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neighboring countries, including Ryūkyū and the Portuguese outpost on the island of Luzon in
the Philippines. Ryūkyū, then in a tributary relationship with China, sent a letter of warning to
the Ming court, and a second warning arrived from another source; however, as the Ming
received no notice from Joseon, they began to suspect collusion with the Japanese.11 Unlike other
scholarship, however, Okuda suggests that Hideyoshi intended to sow distrust from the start. He
writes the following:
“If Hideyoshi were to first send out an army, he had to detect how strong the Ming
military was. In other words, because the army to invade Korea and attack the Ming had
to first destroy the Korean army on the peninsula and right after cross the wide Yalu
River to enter Ming, he required a policy that would enable him to oppose two countries.
Supposing that the Ming court sent their great defensive army directly to Joseon,
Hideyoshi’s small army would have to confront it. Although the prospects of victory
were clear from the start, Hideyoshi feared sustaining great damage to his troops.
Therefore, along with sending out his armies, he had to have a policy to make Ming
doubt Joseon and as much as possible delay the dispatch of their army.”12
Following this, he describes the process by which this doubt developed, as outlined at the
beginning of this paragraph.
Okuda’s description of the situation is in itself accurate – we can be fairly certain that
Hideyoshi knew of the close relationship between Joseon and China, that he knew that fighting
both at the same time would be difficult, and that a policy to avoid fighting them both at the
same time would improve his chances of victory. However, his claim that Hideyoshi intended to
sow doubt between them is a leap of thought that goes beyond the available evidence. No
contemporary scholarship cited in this essay makes any argument to this point, and Okuda
himself fails to cite any documents that support his claim, indicating that he has done nothing
more than make a supposition. According to accounts, what led the Ming to become suspicious
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of Joseon is the fact that they received word of Hideyoshi’s coming invasion from two separate
sources while hearing nothing from Joseon. How could Hideyoshi possibly have known that
Joseon would hesitate in this way? The entire strategy hinges on this single chance. If indeed this
was Hideyoshi’s plan, he is lucky that it worked at all. Regardless, given the flimsy evidence for
this hypothesis and the certainty with which Okuda presents it, this is just one more reason to
show that he went out of his way to portray Hideyoshi as a cunning strategist.
As we have seen, Okuda consistently shows keen attention to detail and factual accuracy
in his narrative, giving all the details regardless of how they reflect on Japan or the other parties.
In addition, he tends to write without judgment against the parties involved, though he does often
interpret Hideyoshi’s actions in the most positive light possible. This attempt to portray
Hideyoshi positively also appears in Itō’s writings. Kemuyama, in contrast, does not overtly
praise Hideyoshi, as we saw, but neither did he criticize him. This lack of criticism, then, is a
common characteristic shared by each of the writers examined so far, and one which is further
reflected in the works of Hayashi Taisuke, considered below.
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Chapter 6: Hayashi Taisuke
Hayashi Taisuke, like Kemuyama, was a formally trained academic, but in contrast he
made history the primary focus of his career. Born in 1854 in Shimosa (modern Chiba), he was
the oldest of other authors discussed here. As a youth he received a traditional Confucian
education, but later graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1886 with a degree in the
Classics and eventually became employed as a teacher at the Tokyo Higher Normal School (東
京高等師範学校). Today he is known best for his work as a historian of Korea and China.1
Regarding his work on Korea, from 1891 to 1912 he published a series of three histories of
Korea, each one building on and expanding the work of the previous and culminating in An
Historical Overview of Chōsen [Joseon] (1912). The chapter concerning the Imjin War,
considered here, originally appeared in his book Early Modern Korean History (1901) and was
reprinted unchanged in Overview.
To gauge Hayashi’s attitude towards this topic, a consideration of his introduction to both
of these books is in order; these two introductions, one written before the annexation of Korea
and the other after, each reflect this change of circumstance, but in both cases his stated intent is
didactic. He frames his first book, which was published in 1901, in a spare, academic fashion,
providing nothing more than his credentials and defining his terms, such as distinguishing Joseon
from the other kingdoms that had existed on the peninsula.2 His second book, published soon
after the Japanese annexation of Korea, takes on an even more explicit didactic angle: he
1
2
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suggests that since the two countries have become one, it is important for the Japanese people to
know Korea’s history. He further notes the peninsula’s geopolitical importance, saying that its
location at “the throat of the orient” makes it an important place for the major powers of the
world, including Japan.3 We should also note that, like Kemuyama, his preface does not include
anything that obviously indicates bias on his part – as far as his words here reveal, he does not
appear to want anything more than to tell the history of Korea for the benefit of the people of
Japan.
Unlike Kemuyama, however, this indication bears out in his narrative of the war as well:
he presents the most objective narrative of all considered here, one that is entirely consistent with
contemporary scholarship, expressing no judgment or misinformation while dispassionately
narrating the events of the war. For contrast, recall the language of Itō, Kemuyama, and Okuda,
who each to greater or lesser extents either misrepresented the narrative of the war or actively
worked to excuse Japan for the war. Hayashi, in contrast, narrates the events and rarely inserts
his own opinions, or even uses adjectives or adverbs that indicate judgment. For example,
recalling Kemuyama’s descriptions of Ryūkyū, he suggests that the island kingdom was
“obstinate” and “rude” to Japan; Hayashi eschews this kind of language. When he does insert his
opinions, he does so in a way that is consistent with the evidence. To illustrate, when discussing
Hideyoshi’s plans for the invasion, he states that the warlord held these plans for a long time but
was only certain of attempting it once he had achieved hegemony on the islands.4 Though the
available documents do not contain an exact statement that indicates this, considering the fact
that Hideyoshi did not begin the invasion until after this was completed does make Hayashi’s
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supposition here reasonable, certainly much more so than the kinds of conjectures that Itō,
Kemuyama, or Okuda make.
The only point of his narrative that requires scrutiny is the omission of details that could
conceivably be embarrassing for Japan. For example, envoy Tachibana Yasuhiro’s insults to the
Koreans and other bad behavior, Sō Yoshitoshi’s arrogant conduct on Tsushima, or the long
length of time that Hideyoshi kept the Joseon envoy waiting for him in Kyoto both before and
after he granted them an audience, and he also does not discuss in detail the contents of
Hideyoshi’s letters, which the Joseon officials interpreted as insolent and rude. Hayashi does,
however, state clearly in the first paragraph of the chapter that “since this is an event connected
to our Japan, extant sources are not few, and since comparatively many have appeared in our
society, the facts connected with Japan will as much as possible be abbreviated and I will chiefly
speak of the conditions internal to Joseon.”5 In this way, Hayashi offers a plausible explanation
as to why he does not discuss these details. Whether he had an ulterior motive in leaving out
these details and used the above as an excuse cannot be confirmed, but given the overall quality
of his work, it is likely that this is not the case.
Beyond the above point, there is little more to analyze in Hayashi’s narrative – that is to
say, further analysis would yield little more than confirmation of his claims in other scholarship
or in historical documents, a process which would be tedious and uninteresting for the reader.
However, this quality of his work is precisely what makes it so interesting in the context of the
other narratives of the Imjin War that were written at this time. As shown above, each of the
writers in their own ways expresses numerous identifiable biases in their narratives that in one
way or another shift focus away from Hideyoshi as an aggressor. Hayashi, in contrast, does no
5
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such thing. Though he may have excluded details that could be perceived as embarrassing to
Japan, his factual narrative of events, devoid of judgment or criticism for the parties involved,
makes his work an important subject for future study. Does the rest of his narrative of this war,
and his narratives of other events in Korean history measure up to the part that has been
examined here? Does he consistently maintain this quality of work over the course of his career?
If so, then this would make him a scholar worthy of note, who showed the ability to maintain a
greater degree of objectivity that many others writing about Korea in this politically charged
climate.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
The four authors that considered here – Itō Gingetsu, Kemuyama Sentarō, Okuda Naoki,
and Hayashi Taisuke – are a diverse group. In education, we have the lesser educated such as Itō,
the university educated Hayashi and Kemuyama, and with Hayashi even possessing a more
traditional Confucian education in addition to a Western university education. Some were
professional academics like Kemuyama and Hayashi; others were reporters and commentators
like Itō and Okuda. Three lived and wrote while living in Japan; Okuda, notably, spent an
extensive period of time living in Korea. Their writings on the Imjin War are also diverse. Some
wrote extensively on Korea, such as Okuda and Hayashi; others – Itō and Kemuyama – only
wrote about Korea and the war incidentally. Some wrote biographies, some wrote topical
histories, and still others wrote general histories. Through this diversity, however, we see a
number of commonalities that arise, which give us a view into general characteristics of Imjin
War narratives at the close of the Meiji period.
The first common characteristic an absence of any critical judgment of Japan or
Hideyoshi, though this tendency is expressed differently from one author to the next. One way
this was done was by suggesting that the invasion was a natural response to the circumstances, as
appeared in Itō’s Hideyoshi in His Later Years, where he argued that the invasion was the result
of the “principle of Japanese nation building,” suggesting that the natural course for Japan was to
expand outward when there is surplus power in the country. A weaker version of such a
naturalistic argument also appears in Okuda’s writings, though the main thrust of his narrative
emphasized and even praises Hideyoshi’s agency. He writes, “perhaps we should say it was duly
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natural for he who brimmed with advantages [to possess the ambition to invade Korea and attack
the Ming].”1 A second way that these authors avoided judging Japan was by either explicitly or
implicitly blaming China, as we saw in Itō’s Japan, Country of the Sea and Kemuyama’s True
Affairs of the Invade Korea Debate. Regarding Itō, recall that in both A History of Japanese
Piracy and Hideyoshi in His Later Years, where he suggests spuriously that Hideyoshi sought to
invade Ming because they failed to praise him for putting an end to pirate raids on the coasts. In
Kemuyama’s account, he emphasizes that Hideyoshi wanted to repair relations with the Ming
and invaded because they refused to comply, which as we recall is not accurate. In the case of
Hayashi, he simply did not make any comment, either implicit or explicit, that indicated
judgment of Hideyoshi or the war.
That these writings do not express criticism of Hideyoshi’s foreign invasions – at least
insofar as he did engage in foreign invasions at all – it not surprising given the two successful
foreign wars that had occurred in the two decades prior to these writings. Given these successes,
a criticism of Hideyoshi’s invasions, at least insofar as criticizing them as foreign invasions,
would be an implicit criticism of those recent wars, although certainly a writer who was critical
of those wars, would likely criticize Hideyoshi. For this reason, one can at least tentatively
conclude that these authors did not look unfavorably towards the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars.
A point worth investigating would be whether the attitudes that these authors expressed might
have been influenced by the Meiji era wars, or whether such positive or neutral attitudes began to
appear prior to them. Given some general comments made by other Japanese scholars concerning
writings of Hideyoshi and the Imjin War from the Edo period, a case could be made both for
continuity and for change, or we could even say that there was a mixture of both.

1
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Regarding popular Edo period attitudes toward Hideyoshi, Kuwata Tadachika, in his
study of writings of Hideyoshi, indicates that they were in fact predominately positive. Noting
the extent of falsehoods contained in these Taiko legends (太閤伝記) and Taiko stories (太閤物
語), he writes that “there are hardly any falsehoods that damage Hideyoshi’s reputation.”.2 This
indicates a popular view of Hideyoshi as hero of sorts, and indeed the most positive views of
Hideyoshi and the invasions are to be found among our popular writers, Okuda and Itō. Viewed
from a popular perspective, then, it does appear based on this limited evidence that these
attitudes represent continuity from earlier writings. However, in the case of intellectual writers,
there appears to be shift in attitudes, though this can only be characterized as a shift from critical
to neutral. As discussed above, the two academic writers, Hayashi and Kemuyama, are neutral in
their opinions – or, better to say, they do not offer any explicit opinion. Ōmori Kingorō, however,
writing of Edo period intellectual discourses on the Imjin War, writes that, “as a rule
[intellectuls] did not have sympathy for Hideyoshi. On the whole, although there were those who
praised Hideyoshi, there was no praise for his foreign invasions.3 He then goes on to cite several
examples of those who explicitly judged those invasions to be improper or immoral. The neutral
stance that our two intellectuals take, then, may represent a shift from critical to neutral. A
further recommendation for future research, then, would be to examine any intellectual narratives
written in the early Meiji period to see if Edo period attitudes persisted or if they began to change
before the Meiji period foreign wars; in addition, analysis of subsequent narratives would also
help confirm whether or not the attitudes of Hayashi and Kemuyama are anomalous.
A second common characteristic is that, though some shifted blame for the war to Ming
China, none of them attempted to do the same with Korea. In the case of Hayashi and Okuda,
2
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neither one makes arguments regarding blame for the war at all, and Okuda even makes a point
of mentioning that the Japanese envoys to Korea were treated cordially and he is not shy about
mentioning ways in which the Japanese envoys and even Hideyoshi himself behaved improperly,
facts that, if he had wanted to blame the Koreans, he would certainly have de-emphasized.
Interestingly, though, Kemuyama and Itō go even further, almost completely effacing Korea
from their discussions altogether. In Itō’s case, he hardly mentions Korea, focusing most of his
attention on the relationship between Japan and the Ming. Kemuyama also puts his emphasis on
the Ming, but acknowledges Korea only enough to excuse their refusal to allow Hideyoshi to
borrow the roads to Ming, saying that they were afraid. This last point does reveal that at least
there was a case to be made for shifting blame to the Koreans: one could easily imagine that one
who wanted to impugn Korea in this way could plausibly make the case that they were at fault
for not letting Hideyoshi used the roads, yet none do so. Therefore, despite there being the
opportunity to blame Korea, none do so.
The fact that these authors avoided writing critically about Korea draws a contrast with
other writings about Korea that were published around the same time: following the RussoJapanese War, when Korea became a protectorate of Japan, many began writing about the
Koreans and often this writings took on an explicitly critical viewpoint. Of these, Todd Henry’s
discussion of Japanese ethnographies of Korea is a good example: in his discussion, he examines
several examples of Koreans being portrayed as almost subhuman, imbecilic, and filthy. 4 Our
writers, however, do not take explicitly critical views of Korea or Koreans in general. Though
indeed those such as Itō and Kemuyama hardly mention Korea at all, Hayashi and Okuda, who
do, also eschew such critical views. Okuda himself is particularly positive in his
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characterizations of Koreans interactions with Japan, repeatedly emphasizing the politeness and
care with which the Joseon officials dealt with their Japanese counterparts and quite openly
acknowledges the general lack of decorum on the Japanese side, though he does at times excuse
it. All in all, then, their attitudes towards Korea contrast sharply with these ethnographers.
Although off the topic for this line of research, an expanded search to locate other enclaves of
Japanese writings on Korea that express similar neutrality or even positivity might be useful to
paint a more nuanced picture of Japanese colonial discourse than what currently exists.
The usefulness of this recommendation is evident from the fact that much of the research
on colonial Japanese discourses has up until now focused either entirely or in part on examining
the nature of the biases in Japanese writers of the colonial period. To list some examples, there is
Henry’s study cited earlier, and also such works as Robert Tierney’s Tropics of Savagery, Stefan
Tanaka’s Japan’s Orient, and Ruth Rogaski’s Hygienic Modernity, each of which in their own
way explore prejudicial attitudes that various elements of Japanese society held towards their
colonial subjects. While doubtless these works of scholarship are valuable, thought-provoking,
and illuminating, they do not address writers such as Hayashi who, at least in the portion of his
writings considered here, do not so obviously express these prejudices. By focusing on these
elements of the Japanese imperial ideology to the exclusion of other voices, the resulting picture
of imperial Japan may be skewed. A broad study of writings from the Meiji period until the end
of World War II with the goal of assessing the prevalence of writers of writers who attained a
greater degree of objectivity in their work would do much to either correct or confirm the
impression that current scholarship creates.
Finally, these four authors’ attitudes towards China, which range from neutral to critical,
occupy a complicated and evolutionary space in popular Japanese attitudes, one that ranges from
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laudatory, to critical, to altogether unacknowledged. Urs Matthias Zachman, for example,
identifies two main trends in Japanese public opinion of China that persisted through the Edo
period: a political trend in which China was “studiously ignored” and a cultural trend in which
China maintained high status,5 though this cultural trend is further complicated with the Nativist
(国学) school of thought that saw Chinese influence on Japan as pernicious and corrosive to
Japanese essence. None of these trends, however, appear obviously in these narratives of the
Imjin War. As we have seen, China features importantly in all of these writings, suggesting that
it was certainly not ignored, and yet as we have seen, none of these writers explicitly praise
China either. Though Itō and Kemuyama do criticize, they do not do so from a Nativist
perspective, which would emphasize China’s negative influence on Japan, but rather scapegoat
the Ming. Even Okuda and Hayashi, who present the most neutral attitudes, neither ignore, nor
praise, nor malign. These attitudes, then, represent a new direction in popular attitudes towards
China.
The range of attitudes expressed in these works does reflect the complex nature of lateMeiji views of China. Returning to Zachman’s study, we find popular discourses replete with
examples of a wide variety of attitudes, from openly antagonistic to friendly and everything in
between, though he his narrative suggests several peaks of hostile intensity (the mid-1880s and
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), interspersed with periods of relative tranquility. 6 The most
fundamental change, he argues, occurred in the political discourse following the Sino-Japanese
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War (1904-5) that followed the reversal of power relations between the two countries.7 He writes
as follows:
The Sino-Japanese War did not have the effect of turning respect into contempt and
undermining ‘a millennium of harmonious Sino-Japanese relations.’ […] Moreover, these
events paradoxically did not encourage the Japanese public to continue its prewar
harangue against China as the ‘common enemy’ of civilization, but led to a
rapprochement between China and Japan which, in the Japanese public view, was
rationalized as the revival of Sino-Japanese friendship.8

Our writers, however, at times match the trend as he describes it and at other times defy it. The
most explicit defiance is Itō’s narrative, which contains the harshest language directed towards
China of any considered here. The other writers, however, do reflect this trend: Okuda and
Hayashi do not present negative views, and Kemuyama, though implying that the Ming
prompted the war, nonetheless does not use harsh or judgmental language when describing this.
In this case, then, this sample of Imjin War narratives does support Zachman’s distillation of the
period, though Itō is a notable outlier, evidence of the variety of attitudes present at this time.
These author’s attitudes and their narratives of the Imjin War, as discussed above, show
the influence of the Meiji period socio-political situation. Despite writing about regimes that
ceased to exist centuries before, with possibly the exception of Hayashi, each of them expresses
some form of prejudice that can be traced to Japan’s position with respect to its neighbors, from
the tendency to either praise Hideyoshi or at least exonerate him, to the tendency to shift blame
to China and to either minimize or exonerate Korea as an actor in the conflict. These narratives,
though comprising of just a small part of the overall zeitgeist of this period, nonetheless add to
our understanding of the complexities of popular attitudes, revealing details about how the
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people of Japan viewed themselves, how they viewed their past, and even to some extent how
they viewed their future.
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